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Abstract 
 
 This thesis examines the relationship between oil prices and 
economic activity, and it attempts to address the question: do increases in oil 
prices (oil shocks) precede U.S. recessions? This paper also applied 
macroeconomics, either through the direct use of a macroeconomic point of view 
or using a combination of mathematical and statistical models. Two mathematical 
and statistical models are used to determine the ability of oil prices to predict 
recessions in the United States. First, using the binary cyclical (Bry-Boschan 
method) indicator procedure to test the turning point of oil prices compared with 
turning points in GDP finds that oil prices almost always turn five month before a 
recession, suggesting that an oil shock might occur before a recession.  Second, 
the Granger causality test shows that oil prices change do Granger cause U.S. 
recessions, indicating that oil prices are a useful signal to indicate a U.S. recession. 
Finally, combining this analysis with the literature, there are several potential 
explanations that the spike in oil prices result in slower GDP growth and are a 
contributing factor to U.S. recessions. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 The effect of an unfavorable oil shock on aggregate output has been the 
focus of economic research for a long time. Oil is one of the important inputs to an 
economy; changing or increasing oil prices has a large impact on an economy as a 
whole. Hamilton (1983) presented strong evidence indicating that an increase in 
oil prices has been one of the primary causes of recessions, which is a period in 
which economic activity declines for two or more consecutive quarters. Over the 
past few decades, ten out of eleven U.S. recessions were preceded by an increase 
in oil prices (oil shocks).  The exception is the recession of 1960, as shown later in 
Figure 4. 
  Many economists continue to research oil price shocks including Kilian 
(2008c), Jones et al (2004), Brow and Yucel (2002), Mork and Hall (1980), and 
Rasche and Tatom (1977).  The literature concludes that significant increases in 
oil prices (oil shocks) lead to slower GDP growth and was a contributing factor of 
U.S. recessions, higher unemployment, and increases in the cost of living. Since 
1947, the United States has experienced eleven recessions, causing a drop in stock 
market prices, decreases in housing prices and high unemployment. Furthermore, 
there is some evidence that the effect of oil prices on the macroeconomy may not 
be linear; a negative effect of a sharp increase in oil prices is more outstanding 
than the positive effect of the same size of a decrease in oil prices. 
 This paper tests for a relationship between oil prices and economic activity, 
and it attempts to address the question: are increases in oil prices precede U.S. 
recessions? Since oil is an important input into the economy, an increase in oil 
prices will put great pressure on other prices.  Moreover, a number of studies have 
tested and concluded that changes in oil prices and economic output may not just 
be a statistical coincidence and that these two events occur in the same time 
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period.1 However, Lardic and Mignon (2006), Blanchard and Gali (2007), Segal 
(2007), and Katayama (2012) consider the oil price shock effect a less important 
source of macroeconomic fluctuations and speculate that the effect of oil shocks 
has decreased during the post-World War II period. 
There are no studies that specifically focus on the oil shock effect in the 
most recent U.S. recession. What makes this paper different from previous studies 
is that it uses the Bry-Boschan method to examine the relationship between oil 
prices and U.S. recessions and finds that oil price shocks precede recessions. A 
series of contributions by Hamilton (1983, 1996, 2005, and 2009) has presented 
strong evidence that one of the main reasons for the recessions in the United States 
is due to an increase in oil prices. 
 This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the previous studies 
on the relationship between the oil prices and U.S. recessions. Section 3 describes 
the data being used. Section 4 describes the methods used. Section 5 analyzes all 
the data using the various methods to describe the relationship between oil prices 
and U.S. recessions. Section 6 contains a conclusion of this paper’s findings. 
 
 
 
 
 
1  Hamilton (1983), Burbidge and Harrison (1984), Gisser and Goodwin (1986), Daniel (1997), Carruth, Hooker, and 
Oswald (1998), and Hamilton (2003) etc.  
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
 
Energy, specifically oil, is one of the most important and crucial raw 
materials in the United States’ economy. Oil products are generally used for 
different purposes such as transportation and heating. One of the largest 
consumers of petroleum in the United States is the transportation sector, including 
the transportation necessary for the supply and use of petroleum.  Thus, the price 
of oil is one of the most important prices in the economy. The price of oil is 
widely used to indicate the value of other energy resources.  For this reason many 
studies have been conducted to better understand the relationship between oil 
prices and macroeconomics, either through the direct use of a macroeconomic 
point of view or using a combination of mathematical and statistical 
models.2  Many previous studies have concluded that oil prices have been a 
significant influence on U.S. economic activity. Therefore, significant increases 
in oil prices could be a contributing factor to U.S. recessions.  
According to Hamilton (1996), an oil shock occurs when oil prices exceed 
its three years peak. Also, Hamilton (2003) identifies an oil shock to be equal to 
the difference between the current oil price and the maximum price in the past 
four or twelve quarters if the difference is positive and is equal to zero otherwise. 
Hamilton (1983 and 1985) describes the primary catalysts for oil price spikes to 
2 The literature on the relationship between a spike up in oil price and macroeconomic activity can be divided into two 
broad strands: 
1. Examination of the direct affects of oil price increases on aggregate output such as Hamilton (1983, 1985, 
1988, 1996, 2003, and 2005), Kilian (2005), Rogoff (2006), Rotemberg and Woodford (1996). 
 
2. Examination of the direct and indirect effects arising from the central bank policy responses to the inflation 
caused by increasing oil prices such as Bohi (1989), Bernanke et al (1997), Hamilton and Herrera (2004). 
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include political disturbances such as the Suez Crisis, the Arab-Israel War, the 
Iranian Revolution, the Iran and Iraq War, and the Persian Gulf War. Moreover, 
oil shocks have, in the past, largely been the result of conflicts on the supply side. 
However, there was an exception with an oil shock that took place from 2007 to 
2008. This oil shock occurred due to rapidly increasing energy consumption in 
both India and China, which has been growing at a 7% compounded annual rate 
over the last two decades (Hamilton 2009).  
The macroeconomics of oil price shocks has had a long history that began 
with the first oil crises in 1973. Hamilton (1983) believes that all but one of the 
U.S. recessions since World War II has been preceded by an increase in the price 
of oil, except the recession of 1960.3 He also claims that the relationship between 
oil prices and the U.S. economy are systematic, in which oil price increases are 
followed by a decline in output, which causes a recession, three to four quarters 
later.4 Rotemberg and Woodford (1996) also show the results from a simulation 
in which a 10% increase in energy prices could lead to a 2.5% drop in output six 
quarters later. 
However, the effect of oil shocks can also be asymmetric and can either 
increase or decrease the macroeconomy because the insecurity of oil prices can 
cause delays in business investments.5 Increases also encourage resource 
reallocation.6 When oil prices decline, they encourage the transfer of aggregate 
3 Brown and Yucel (2002) indicate that increases in oil prices proceeded eight out of nine post WWII recessions in the 
U.S.  
4 Rachel and Tatom (1997), Baily (1981), Jones, Leidy, and Paik (2004), and Wei (2003) also believe that oil shocks 
affect macroeconomic activity. 
 
5 Bernanke ( 1983), Pindyck (1991), Hamiltion (1996), Lee et al (1995), a Mork ( 1989), Davis and Haaltiwanger 
(1998), and Ferderer (1996) 
6 Lilien (1982), Hamilton (1988),  Jones, Leiby, and Paik (2003), Loungani (1986) 
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channels (output, income, and wage) and allocate channels (labor and capital) to 
respond to the economic effects. Furthermore, there is some evidence that the 
effect of oil prices on the macroeconomy may not be linear; a negative effect of a 
spike up in oil prices is more outstanding than the positive effect of the same size 
of a decrease in oil prices. 
There are many studies on the effect of oil price shocks.7  There are six 
transmission channels that affect the following variables when there are changes 
in oil prices, according to Brown and Yucel (2002). The first is a supply–side 
effect, which focuses on the direct impact on output due to the change in marginal 
production cost caused by oil price shock.8  Also, the supply – side effect causes a 
reduction in the accessibility of basic inputs to production, shifts in demand, 
monetary policy changes and adjustment costs. Second, the wealth transfer effect 
emphasizes the different marginal consumption rates of petrodollar and that of 
ordinary trade surpluses. The result of this effect is a shift in purchasing power 
from the oil import nations to oil export nations which reduces consumer 
demands in oil import nation and increase consumer demand in oil export nations. 
Third is the inflation effect, which looks at the relationship between domestic 
inflation and oil prices.  An increase of the oil price increases the inflation rate, 
which will raise the cost of living. Fourth is the real balance effect which includes 
the change in money demand and monetary policy. If monetary policy fails to 
meet the growth of money demand, this would boost the interest rate, and slow 
economic growth. Fifth is sector adjustment, which is the adjustment cost of 
 
7 Mork (1989), Lardic and Mignon (2006), Hooker (1996), and Blanchard and Gali (2010) find that the relationship 
between the oil price and macroeconomy is weakening. Davis and Haltiwanger (2001) also find evidence that the 
impact of oil price shocks on manufacturing employment growth is weaker in an extended sample including the late 
1980s and the early 1990s.  
 
8 See Rasche and Tatom (1977 and 1981), Barro (1984), and Brown and Yucel (1999) 
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changing the industrial structure, and is mainly used to explain the asymmetric 
impact of oil price shocks. Asymmetry in oil prices shocks is that a negative 
effect of a spike up in oil prices is more outstanding than the positive effect of the 
same size of a decrease in oil prices.  Finally, the unexpected effect focuses on 
the uncertainly of oil prices and its impact on economic activity. It can cause 
insecurity and delays in business investments and encourage resource 
reallocation.  Bernanke et al. (1997) concluded that about two–thirds of the 
quarters with decreases in output after an oil shock can be attributed to monetary 
policy tightening, specifically when the increase in oil prices is followed by rise 
in the federal fund rate.  
Nordhus (2007) finds that oil prices can directly affect output through an 
increase in inflation and tight monetary policy as a response of the central bank. 
This will cause output to drop and can affect the consumer by increasing 
consumption taxes. Bernanke (1983) claims that oil shocks may disrupt the 
purchase of more expensive consumer and investment goods, which may impact 
the economy in the short-run. A major oil price shock can cause people to be 
uncertain about the future and reduce spending on items such as cars, housing, 
appliances, and investments. 
However, there are several pieces of research that indicate that the 
macroeconomic effect of oil price shocks have decreased since 1970.  Blanchard 
and Gali (2007) find that there are at least four reasons for the decreased affect on 
inflation and macroeconomic activity such including prices, wages, output, and 
employment, following the recent spike in oil prices. In the general market, the 
first reason is due to more choice of the alternate energy causing the lack of effect 
on the oil prices and decline in volatility. Secondly, the lack of resources has 
caused a smaller share of oil production which cause the production to be 
controlled by a small group of people allowing them to dictate the market based 
13 
 
on their group of strategy. The third reason is the increase of resources that have 
been reallocated, which created more flexibility in labor market. Finally, the 
improvement in monetary policies helped to improve the economy as a whole. 
However, Segal (2007) presents several arguments as to why high oil prices in the 
past several years have not slowed the economy. He says that the importance of 
oil prices is often overemphasized. In addition, high oil prices have not led to 
monetary tightening in the past few years as they are no longer considered when 
calculating core inflation. Moreover, Katayama (2012) also mentions three 
reasons that have reduced the effects of oil price shocks. They include high 
competition in transportation, an increase in energy efficiency, and oil prices have 
less effect on the people lives because currently, people have the option of 
alternative energy to choose from. 
However, Barsky and Kilian (2002) argue that recessions may be partly 
exogenous due to the change in monetary policy, which occurred at the same time 
as the oil prices shock. Bernanke, Gertler, and Watson (1997) argue that U.S. 
recessions happened due to the rise in interest rates, resulting from the Federal 
Reserve’s endogenous response to higher inflation, which was a result of the oil 
shock.   
There is further discussion on the impact that oil shocks have had on the 
United States economy. Hamilton (2009) concludes that oil shocks have 
historically contributed to past U.S. recessions and he also claims that if there had 
been no oil shock, in 2007-2008 the U.S. economy would have grown slowly, but 
it would not have fallen into a recession. Thus, Blanchard–Gali support Hamilton 
in that the oil shock in the 2007-2008 periods led to the recession in 2009. Gisser 
and Goodwin (1986) found that oil prices have had further impacts on the 
macroeconomic indicators, exceeding the effect of monetary and fiscal policy. 
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Several studies have tested and concluded that co-movement of oil price 
and economic output may not be just a statistical coincidence. The scholars who 
support this hypothesis include Rasche and Tatom (1977, 1981), Burbidge and 
Harrison (1984), Santini (1985, 1994), Gisser and Goodwin (1986), Rotemberg 
and Woodford (1996), Daniel (1997), Raymond and Rich (1997), Carruth, 
Hooker, and Oswald (1998). 
Finally, according to the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), 
the recent U.S. economy was in the longest and worst recession since World War 
II, and was18 months from December 2007 to June 2009. Hamilton (2009) and 
Kilian (2009) note that at the beginning of July 2008 the oil price reached 145 
dollars per barrel, which is the highest price in history and they claim it 
significantly contributed to the recession in 2009. Carstensen, Elstner, and Paula 
(2011) also claim that the increase in oil price in 2007 to 2008 caused a 0.8 
percent reduction of German GDP in 2009 and contributed to the recession in 
2009. Moreover, Hamilton (2009) said “the evidence to me is persuasive that, if 
there had there been no oil shock, we would have described the U.S. economy 
from 2007 to 2008 as growing slowly, but not in a recession”. He also claims that 
the collapse in automobile purchases, deteriorating consumer sentiment, and 
slowdown in overall consumption spending, was caused by the oil shock and was 
one of the contributing factors causing the recent U.S. recession in 2009. 
Appendix E also summarizes the studies that related to the research topic. 
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Chapter 3 Data description 
 
 This research analyses the relationships between oil prices and U.S. 
economic activity using United States data. The sample period of the analysis and 
model is from January 1949 to December 2012 on a quarterly basis. This data 
includes the first post-World War II period, the recession in 1949, which is the 
earliest data that the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) has in the 
record of U.S. Business Cycle expansions and contractions.  This study uses real 
gross domestic product (real GDP) and real oil prices from the U.S. Department of 
Commerce Bureau of Economic Analysis.  Also, it uses the quarterly growth in 
real GDP from the website Economagic. Oil price is measured by the producer 
price index for oil prices (WPU 0561 Oil Price Index) using monthly data from the 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. This paper converts the monthly data to quarterly 
data by averaging every three months of data into a single quarterly period.  
Further, this study also uses business cycle expansions and contractions identified 
by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). This is the standard or 
“official” designation of U.S. business cycles. 
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Chapter 4 Methods of Analysis 
 
This study uses a dynamic time series-based regression of the historical 
data to evaluate the hypothesis of Hamilton (2005). This is done using the same 
set of data as used by Hamilton. Regressions are one of the most popular and wide 
spread methods used to analyze the relationship between oil prices and U.S. 
economic activity.9  The regression was run using a lagged change in quarterly 
GDP growth rate and a lagged logarithmic change in quarterly nominal oil price 
(WPU 0561 Oil Price Index) from 1949II to 2005II. The specific data used can be 
found in appendix A and the result of this regression can be found in appendix B. 
These regression results will be used in an attempt to duplicate the results from 
Hamilton in order to predict the relationship between oil prices and U.S. 
recessions.  
Moreover, the regression method will be used to examine and predict the 
relationships between the oil prices and U.S. recessions in the Granger Causality 
tests. The eight periods of lagged changes in quarterly GDP growth rate and the 
eight period of lagged logarithmic change in nominal oil price but from 1949 II to 
2012 II also are used. The result of this Granger Causality test can be found in 
appendix C. 
The Bry- Boschan method is used to identify the turning points in oil price 
and GDP cycle, which no other research papers have used to predict the 
relationship between oil prices and U.S. recessions. This paper tries to find a 
consistent relationship over time with movements and changes in oil prices and 
U.S. recessions by using the Bry- Boschan method to identify the turning point of 
9 Hamilton (1983), Hamilton (2003), Hamilton (2005), Hooker (1996) ,and Mork (1989) 
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these cycles. After the turning points are found, they will be used to compare the 
GDP peaks and troughs with those of oil prices  
Correlation tests are used to examine the oil prices cycle and GDP cycle, to 
find the correlations between these. This correlation tests the relationship between 
the WPU oil price index cycles from the Bry – Boschan procedure and the NBER 
U.S. cycle. Also, this paper uses the correlation test with the oil prices and U.S. 
GDP to examine how they are correlating over time. 
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Chapter 5 Analysis  
5.1 U.S. Recession trends 
 
 A recession is a period in which economic activity declines in two or more 
consecutive quarters. In the United States, most organizations such as universities, 
academics, economics, policy makers, and businesses use the recessions identified 
by the Business Cycle Dating Committee of the National Bureau of Economic 
Research . The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) defines an 
economic recession as: "a significant decline in economic activity spread across 
the economy, lasting more than a few months, normally visible in real GDP, real 
income, employment, industrial production, and wholesale-sales”. There are many 
different factors of economic activity that work together to contribute to 
recessions. These include investment, government spending, net export activity, 
and consumption. Moreover, these factors are driven by other things such as 
corporate investment decisions, interest rates, demographics, employment levels 
and skills, household savings rates, and government policies. Over the past 
decades since 1947, the United States has experienced eleven recessions which 
caused a drop in stock market prices, decreases in housing prices, high 
unemployment, low economic growth or high inflation. A recession can last from 
eight months through twenty-four months. Figure 1 shows the U.S. GDP and the 
recessions as bars, in which GDP is one factor that can indicate a recession. No 
single indicator can predict or indicate a recession. It depends on many different 
factors, including GDP, employment, investment spending, capacity utilization, 
and household income, and others.  
19 
 
 Figure 1: GDP in billions of chained 2005 dollars and U.S. recessions 
Note: Recessions identified by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) and U.S. 
GDP from Economagic. 
 The recent U.S. recession was the longest and most profound recession 
since World War II and was 18 months from December 2007 to June 2009, which 
is shown in Table 1.  Table 1 also shows all eleven U.S. recessions since World 
War II compared with the percentage change in GDP, consumption, and 
investment. The collapse in GDP and investment in the 2009 U.S. recession was 
the most intense of the post- war period. However, the cumulative percent change 
in consumer consumption was not the deepest of the post –war period 
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Table 1: Economic indicators during post- War recessions 
 
Note: Data comes from National Bureau of Economic Research based on data from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, and the Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
 
5.2 Oil price trends in the U.S 
 
 Oil prices, like other commodity prices, experience wide swings in times of 
shortage or oversupply, as shown in the Figure 2.  Correspondingly, oil prices are 
sensitive, hard to predict, and have many short-term fluctuations based on demand 
and supply, such as the increase in the oil prices as a result of the Middle East 
supply interruption during the Yom Kippur War and the later crises in Iran and 
Iraq. Before OPEC was established in 1960, the price of oil was low, ranging 
between $2.50 to $3 per barrel.  Prior to OPEC, the Texas Railroad Commission, 
attempted to control oil prices through limitations on production. OPEC replaced 
the Texas Railroad Commission in the 1970’s by monitoring the production 
capacity and attempting to limit production. Nowadays OPEC is the only 
organization that tries to control oil prices, since OPEC is the major oil supplier 
throughout the world. The price will fluctuate according to supply and demand in 
    Cumulative Percent Change  
Dates 
Duration 
(months) GDP Consumption  Investment  
Nov. 1948 - Oct. 1949 11 -1.60% 3.40% -10.20% 
July 1953 - May 1954 10 -2.6 -0.5 -3.4 
Aug. 1957 - April 1958 8 -3.7 -1.3 -8 
April 1960 - Feb. 1961 10 -1.6 1 -5.1 
Dec. 1969 - Nov. 1970 11 -0.6 2.5 -2.6 
Nov. 1973 - March 1975 16 -2.8 -0.7 -18.4 
Jan. 1980 - July 1980 6 -2.2 -1.2 -8.1 
July 1981 - Nov. 1982 16 -2.7 0.1 -9.3 
July 1990 - Mar. 1991 8 -1.4 -0.7 -7.2 
March 2001 - Nov. 2001 8 -0.3 1.2 -3.2 
Dec. 2007 - June 2009 18 -4.1 -2.3 -23.4 
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the market with OPEC attempting to keep prices in a certain range. The volatile 
history of OPEC has varied between restricting supply to increase prices and 
trying to prevent them from falling. Currently, the leadership of Saudi Arabia 
involves a deliberate strategy to stabilize prices by adjusting production. Their 
strategy has not had the ability to smooth out price changes, as shown by the large 
changes after 2005. The long run demand responses to increases in oil prices were 
more important than the short run responses. 
 
Figure 2: Real oil prices  
Note: Oil prices from the U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Economic Analysis 
 
5.3 Oil consumption trends 
 
Oil is one of the most important, fundamental and crucial raw materials in 
the United State economy. Oil products are used for many different purposes, such 
as transportation, which is the largest consumer of petroleum in the United States. 
Figure 3 shows petroleum consumption in the United States from 1949 to 2011 
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(obtained from the Information Administration (EIA)).  The total petroleum 
consumption in the U.S. has been increasing in the past few decades, except for 
the significant decrease in the late 1970s and the early 1980s. In 1970, U.S. 
petroleum production reached its peak; after that, any increase in petroleum 
consumption has been met largely by imports from other countries because the 
United States cannot produce enough petroleum to supply increases in the demand 
for oil. The transportation sector consumes more than half of U.S. petroleum.  
 
Figure 3: U.S. oil consumption by sector from 1949 -2011 
Note: U.S. oil consumption by sector from U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) 
 
5.4 Oil Shocks  
 
An oil shock is a large positive increase in oil prices.  According to 
Hamilton (2003), an oil shock occurs when oil price exceeds the three years peak 
shown in Figure 4. Table 2 also shows the date whenever oil shock occurs. Oil 
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shocks are calculated using the previous three years compared with oil prices at 
that time. If the oil prices are lower when compared with previous three years, this 
indicates no oil shock has happened. However, if oil prices were higher than any 
price in the previous three years, an oil shock would take place. Oil shocks can 
happen from demand increases which contribute significantly to the volatility in 
price. A supply shock (oil production and reserve shock) can also create an oil 
price shock, which affects current and future oil production. Moreover, oil shocks 
affect the economy through consumer spending on other goods; as well as a firm’s 
spending for new investment projects. Oil price increases raise the input cost of 
production and thus reduce production. Oil shocks also have an effect on the rate 
of inflation.  Greenspan (2004) determined that the results of oil price shocks have 
a negative effect on economic activity and employment by causing a firm to face 
higher costs of production and a rise in the inflation rate.  Figure 6 compares oil 
prices, oil shocks and recessions to identify the oil shocks from 1947 to 2012 on a 
quarterly basis. However, several oil shocks have occurred without causing a 
recession but most of them do.  Moreover, ten out of eleven U.S. recessions have 
been preceded by an oil shock, with the exception of the recession in 1960 which 
was not associated with an oil shock. This fact has led to a general acceptance that 
oil price shocks are a likely cause of recessions.  
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 Figure 4: Oil shocks  
Note: Oil shocks identified using the Hamilton (2003) method. An oil shock occurs when the 
current oil price exceeds the maximum price in the previous three years this measure the 
positive difference. 
 
Table 2: Dates of oil shocks 
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5.5 U.S. Recessions and oil prices trends 
 
In a series of contributions, Hamilton (1983, 1996, 2005, and 2009) 
presented strong evidence indicating that increases in oil prices have been one of 
the primary causes of recessions in the United States. Over the past few decades, 
ten out of eleven U.S. recessions followed an increase in oil prices (an oil shock), 
except for the recession of 1960, as shown in Figure 4.  Hamilton (1983 and 1985) 
mentioned that the primary catalysts for oil spikes were military conflicts such as 
the Suez Crisis, the Arab-Israel War, the Iranian Revolution, the Iran and Iraq 
War, and the Persian Gulf War. The largest percentage change in oil prices in most 
events like these has been due to OPEC or military conflicts in Middle East.   
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Figure 5 : Percentage change in producer prices index for oil price and U. S.  Recessions 
Note: identify recession by National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), and oil 
price by U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA)   
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Oil shock is a major factor that contributed to the collapse in automobile 
purchases, a slowdown in overall consumption spending, and deteriorating 
consumer sentiment in recessions. The result from an oil shock can cause low 
income and higher unemployment, which would also depress housing demand. For 
example Hamilton (2008) shows that a1% reduction in real GDP growth translates 
into a 2.6% decrease in the demand for new houses. 
During the first oil price increase (1949) within the data set, the rapid 
increase in oil price resulted from the fact that previous investments in production 
and transportation were inadequate to meet postwar needs. The second oil price 
increase (1953) took place because of Iranian nationalization10 and a strike by oil, 
coal, and steel workers in U.S. which resulted in an oil shortage, causing an 
increase in oil price. The third oil price increase (1957) was a result of the Suez 
Crisis11. The fourth recession (1960) is the most interesting because it was not 
derived from a spike in oil prices.  Oil prices actually decreased during the 1960 
U.S. recession. The fifth oil price increase (1970) preceded the secular decline in 
U.S. Reserves along with the strike of oil workers and the Libyan cutback in 
production (Libyan civil war) resulted in an upturn in oil prices. The sixth oil price 
increase (1974) resulted from stagnating U.S. production, the Yom Kipper War 
and the OPEC embargo, causing oil prices to quadruple. The seventh oil price 
increase (1980) follows the Iranian revolution which led to a significance upsurge 
in oil prices. The eighth oil price increase (1981) followed the Iranian revolution 
that led into the subsequent Iran-Iraq War, which in turn led to a significant 
10 Iranian nationalization is a political event that occurred in Iran in which the Iranian Prime Minister 
Mohammad Mosaddegh was overthrown. This situation caused Iran to explode with various problems that 
led to a long-term deterioration of Iran – United States relations. Iranian nationalization also interrupteds 
the production of oil since Iran was one of the most important countries to supply oil to the market. 
 
11  In order to trade between Asia, the Middle East, Europe and the U.S., these countries would normally 
use the canal, which directly links the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean. However, France and Britain 
wanted to control the canal, not only for commercial shipping but also for colonial interests. The Suez 
Crisis was lasted for two years from 1956-1957. 
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upsurge in oil prices. The ninth oil price increase (1990) was a result of the Persian 
Gulf War from the Iraq invasion of Kuwait. The tenth oil price increase (2000) 
occurred as OPEC cut oil production, triggering oil prices to go above average. 
The most recent oil price increase (2008) took place because of rapidly growing 
demand and tight capacity, crude outages in Nigeria, Iraq, and the North Sea, 
causing the oil prices to rise in June 2008 to the highest in history. All of these oil 
prices increases were followed by U.S. recessions. 
 
Figure 6: Producer price index for oil prices, U.S. recessions, and oil shocks 
Note: Recessions identified by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), oil 
shocks by using the Hamilton (2003) measure, and oil price from the U.S. Department of 
Commerce Bureau of Economic Analysis.  
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5.6 The Bry-Boschan method 
 
 Roberts (2009) describes the method for identifying the turning points in a 
data series using the Bry- Boschan method. The process of identifying turning 
points using the Bry-Boschan method consists of six steps: 
1. Replace any point of data that are more than 3.5 times the standard 
deviation of difference the original data and data that has been smoothed 
using a Spencer curve. 
2. Smooth the adjusted data using a 12 month centered moving average 
smoothing then find highs and lows in this smoothed data over period from 
12 months before to 5 months after each data point. Furthermore, enforce 
(deleted turning point if the rule is violated) the rule that peaks and troughs 
must alternate. The dates of the troughs and peaks are determined as TP1. 
3. Compute a second Spencer curve of the adjusted data and determine the 
highs and lows (as TP2) using a +/- 5 month interval. Refine  TP1 by 
selecting the highs and lows that are within the vicinity of turning points in 
a smoothed data series TP2 over a +/-5 month interval. Also, enforce the 
rules that peaks and troughs must alternate and cycles must have duration 
of at least 15 months. TP3 is the refined set of turning points. 
4. Determine the months of cyclical dominance and use this to compute a 
centered moving average of the adjusted data using this period to find 
turning points as TP4. The TP5 results from the turning points identified in 
TP3 comparing against TP4 over +/- 5 month interval and enforcing the 
rule that troughs and peaks must alternate. 
5. Identify actual highs and lows in the original unadjusted data that are within 
a +/- 5 month interval of the turning points in TP5 and enforce the rules that 
peaks and troughs must alternate and troughs must have a lesser magnitude 
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than peak.  Only these dates of highs and lows in the original series are 
selected as turning points. 
6. Lastly, using the original data series, the following step are iterated until no 
further changes to the turning points are made: enforce the rules that full 
cycles must have a duration of at least 15 months and peak and troughs 
must alternate; ensure that no turning points are closer than 5 months from 
the beginning or end of the data series and the first or last peak (trough) is 
higher (lower) than the first or last data point, and make sure that each 
phase has a duration of at least 6 months. 
This process is used to determine the turning points in oil prices. The 
sample period of the analysis and model is from January 1947 to February 2013 
on a monthly basis. Table 3 shows the results of identifying turning points in oil 
prices by using the Bry- Boschan method. Oil price peaks show the point in time 
when the highest oil prices are reached and oil prices begin to drop. Also, oil 
price troughs show the point where the lowest oil prices are and where the price 
will increase. Table 4 shows the results of turning points of GDP by using the 
Bry- Boschan. GDPs’ peaks show the point where the economy expansion ends 
and economy contraction begins. Additionally, the GDPs’ troughs show the point 
where an economic contraction end and cycles will start over with another 
economic expansion. Cycles consists of expansions, contractions, and full cycles, 
as well as the amplitude of price change during these periods. A peak is the end 
of the expansion or boom phase of the oil price and must follow a trough, which 
is the end of the contraction phase of oil prices. 
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Table 3: Turning points in oil price identified using the Bry- Boschan method 
Oil price ( WPU oil price index cycles) 
Peak Trough 
January,1948 May,1950 
October,1950 Septrmber,1952 
June, 1953 January, 1956 
February,1957 November,1960 
April, 1961 December, 1962 
May, 1963 January, 1966 
April,1969 July, 1970 
January,1971 March, 1972 
February,1981 May,1982 
October,1982 August, 1986 
August,1987 November,1988 
October, 1990 February, 1994 
July,1994 July,1995 
January,1997 December, 1998 
November, 2000 December, 2001 
July, 2006 January, 2007 
July, 2008 January, 2009 
April, 2011 June, 2012 
 
Table 4: Turning points in GDP identified using the Bry- Boschan method 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*   Not preceded by an oil price peak 
** Not preceded by oil price peak, by cleaning occurred during an oil price run up 
GDP 
Peak Trough 
November, 1948 October, 1949 
July, 1953 May, 1954 
August, 1957 April, 1958 
*April, 1960 February, 1961 
December, 1969 November, 1970 
**November, 1973 March, 1975 
**January, 1980 July, 1980 
July, 1981 November, 1982 
July, 1990 March, 1991 
March, 2001 November, 2001 
December, 2007 June, 2009 
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5.7 Turning point behavior of oil prices 
 
This paper focuses on testing the correlation between the oil prices and U.S. 
recessions. First, let us look at the pattern of U.S. recessions and oil prices so as to 
roughly describe their relationship, as shown in Figure 7.  
Figure 7 shows the turning points in oil prices found using the Bry-Boschan 
procedure compared with the oil price and U.S. NBER reference cycles. 
Moreover, Figure 7 shows only ten oil price cycles but it shows eleven U.S. GDP 
cycles. Most of the oil prices cycles (dotted line) found by using Bry- Boschan 
method peak before U.S. recessions but some cycles might peak at the same time 
as with U.S. recessions. As shown in Figure 7, the oil price cycles often give early 
warning indication of GDP turning points, suggesting that oil prices have been a 
reliable indicator of GDP recessions. Figure 7 shows that oil price often expands 
before GDP recessions. 
Table 5 compares the turning points of oil price peaks against GDP peaks. 
For example, oil price peaks ten months before the November 1948 GDP peak and 
oil price peaks one month before July 1953 peak. Thus, the last row of Table 5 
shows the average number of months the oil prices turn before and after the GDP. 
As shown, the average number of months that oil prices lead U.S.GDP is five 
months. They often give early warning indicators of the GDP turning points, 
suggesting that oil prices peaks might be a reliable indicator of GDP recessions. 
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Figure 7: Producer price index for oil price, U.S. recessions from NBER, and oil price 
cycles 
Note: The dashed line identifies the turning points of the business cycles (GDP) from the 
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); the solid line represents the oil prices, 
(WPU 0561 Oil price Index) from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, the circular 
dotted line indicates the oil price cycle found by using the Bry- Boschan method. 
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Table 5: The result of turning point comparison by using the Bry – Boschan method to 
identity GDP and compared with the oil prices peaks 
 
Table 6 compares the turning point of oil prices troughs against the GDP 
troughs. For example, oil prices turn seven months after the October 1949 troughs 
and oil prices turn twenty months after the May 1954 trough. Thus, the last row of 
Table 6 shows the average number of months the oil prices turn up after the GDP 
starts to recover. As shown, the average number of months that oil prices troughs 
lag the GDP troughs is seven months. 
Table 6: The result of turning point comparison by Bry - Boschan method (GDP 
troughs) compared with the oil prices troughs 
GDP peaks 
Number of months that oil price peaks lead (-), or 
lag (+) the GDP peak. 
GDP Oil prices 
November 1948 peaks -10 
July 1953 peaks -1 
August 1957 peaks -6 
April 1960 peaks *12 
December 1969 peaks -8 
November 1973 peaks **-34 
January 1980 peaks **13 
July 1981 peaks -5 
July 1990 peaks 3 
March 2001 peaks -4 
December 2007 peaks -17 
Average -5.18 
GDP troughs 
Number of months that oil price troughs lead (-), or 
lag (+) the GDP trough 
GDP Oil prices 
October 1949 troughs 7 
May 1954 troughs 20 
April 1958 troughs 31 
February 1961 troughs 22 
November 1970 troughs -4 
March 1975 troughs -36 
July 1980 troughs 22 
November 1982 troughs 6 
March 1991 troughs 35 
November 2001 troughs 1 
June 2009 troughs -29 
Average 6.82 
35 
 
5.8 Correlation between real U.S. GDP and real oil prices 
 
 A correlation coefficient indicates the strength of the linear relationship 
between two variables. The values in Table 8 indicate the level of correlation 
between various lags of the variables. Table 8 also shows all strong positive 
correlation between the U.S. GDP from Economagic and oil prices come from the 
EIA in the form of quarterly data. These correlations are all positive which mean 
that U.S. GDP is moving in the same direction as oil prices. 
Table 7:  The correlation between GDP and oil price 
 
5.9 Correlation between WPU oil price index cycles and NBER 
U.S. cycle 
 
 The values in Table 8 indicate the level of correlation between the 
following combinations of variables. The r values in this report indicate the level 
of correlation between the combinations of different variables. Table 8 shows the 
weak positive correlation between the WPU oil price index cycle and NBER U.S. 
cycles, which mean that the WPU oil price index cycles are moving in the same 
direction at the NBER U.S. cycles. Even though the WPU oil price index cycle is 
  Oil price  oil price (t-1) oil price (t-2) oil price (t-3) oil price (t-4) 
GDP  0.819 0.813 0.808 0.802 0.799 
GDP ( t-1) 0.821 0.817 0.811 0.806 0.802 
GDP ( t-2) 0.822 0.819 0.814 0.809 0.805 
GDP ( t-3) 0.824 0.820 0.817 0.813 0.809 
GDP ( t-4) 0.825 0.822 0.818 0.815 0.812 
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positive, the relationship is very weak. Also, the NBER US cycles have a higher 
correlation when the WPU Oil Price Index cycle moves back in different time 
periods. Moreover, in order for the r numbers to be statistically significant, the r 
numbers need to be greater than 0.12, but Table 8 show no sign of significant 
correlation between the WPU oil price index cycles and NBER U.S. cycles. 
Table 8: Correlation between the WPU oil price index cycles and NBER US cycles 
 
5.10 Reproduction of the Hamilton model 
 
 Regression is one of methods that have been used to test for a significant 
relationship between oil prices and a recession. Hamilton used a regression of 
lagged changes in GDP growth rates explained by lagged logarithmic change in 
nominal oil prices from 1949II to 2005II. He found that the coefficient on the 
fourth lag of oil prices is negative and highly statistically significant as shown in 
below: 
 
 
  
WPU Oil 
Price 
Index 
cycles 
WPU Oil 
Price 
Index 
cycles 
 (t-1) 
WPU Oil 
Price 
Index 
cycles 
(t-2) 
WPU Oil 
Price 
Index 
cycles 
(t-3) 
WPU Oil 
Price 
Index 
cycles 
(t-4) 
NBER US cycles 0.076 0.083 0.090 0.097 0.097 
NBER US cycles (t-1) 0.069 0.076 0.083 0.090 0.097 
NBER US cycles (t-2) 0.055 0.069 0.076 0.083 0.090 
NBER US cycles (t-3) 0.055 0.055 0.069 0.076 0.083 
NBER US cycles (t-4) 0.048 0.055 0.055 0.069 0.076 
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Model 1: Hamilton 
GDP = 0.69 + 0.28 GDPt-1 + 0.13 GDPt-2 – 0.07 GDPt-3 – 0.12 GDPt-4 
           (0.11)          (0.07)           (0.07)           (0.07)             (0.07) 
T-score           (4)        (1.86)         (1)       (1.71) 
               – 0.003 Oilt-1 – 0.006 Oilt-2– 0.002 Oilt-3 – 0.015 Oilt-4  (1) 
                    (0.006)        (0.006)           (0.006)            (0.006)      
  T-score        (0.5)           (1)       (0.33)  (2.5) 
Where GDP = GDP growth rates 
 Oil = nominal oil prices 
Hamilton did not report the statics (N, R-Square, Adjusted R –Square, F-
static) result behind the regression expect the equation that shows.  
Model 2: My result  
GDP = 2.76 + 0.30 GDPt-1 + 0.14 GDPt-2 – 0.099 GDPt-3 – 0.097 GDPt-4 
           (6.38)      (4.41)           (2.01)              (-1.42)             (-1.45) 
T-score      (0.68)     (0.07)      (0.07)        (0.067) 
               – 1.23 Oilt-1 – 4.14 Oilt-2 + 1.08 Oilt-3 – 4.45 Oilt-4                (2) 
                (-0.45)          (-1.5)            (0.39)          (-1.63)                 
T-score    (2.73)     (2.76)     (2.77)    (2.73) 
N = 226,    R- square = 0.162,    Adjusted R- square = 0.131,   F-statically = 5.226 
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However, I used the same data and the same method to attempt to duplicate 
the results from Hamilton but could not obtain his results.  
The result from Hamilton shows that all the GDP variables are significant 
and none of oil variables are significant except the fourth lag of oil prices. Also, 
the majority of the oil prices variables have a negative sign which show that oil 
prices and GDP move in opposite direction. My results shows that all GDP 
variables are not significant and all oil prices variables are significant. Also, most 
of the oil prices variables have a negative sign, except for the third lag of oil prices 
that has a positive sign. Except for the third lag in oil prices, we can conclude that 
the direction of oil price moves proceeded and are in the opposite direction with 
GDP. This result supports the idea that oil shocks preceded recessions. The results 
from Model 1 come from Hamilton. Model 2 are my results from using the same 
set of data and time frame. It is not known why Hamilton’s result cannot be 
duplicated 
5.11 Granger Causality tests 
 
 Regression analysis typically cannot prove causality between oil prices and 
U.S. recessions, but regression can give evidence of a relationship. The Granger 
causality test determines if one time series variable consistently and predictably 
changes before another variable, which can be used to indicate causality. Granger 
causality is a useful instrument for forecasting purpose and shows which variable 
precedes another.12  These tests are useful to show if an oil price change precedes 
recessions. There are a number of different tests for Granger causality, but this 
paper uses eight lags of oil price and eight lags of GDP. 
12 Hamilton (1983, 1996, 2003 and 2003) conducted the Granger causality test of whether oil price uncertainty has a 
significant effect on output.  
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 If an oil price change Granger causes a U.S. recession, I would run a simple 
regression for the coefficients with the formula below: 
GDP = Bo + B1GDPt-1 +B2GDPt-2 + B3GDPt-3 + B4GDPt-4 +B5GDPt-5 +B6GDPt-6   
 +B7GDPt-7 + B8GDPt-8 - α1Oilt-1 - α2Oilt-2 - α3Oilt-3 -α4Oilt-4 - α5Oilt-5  
- α6Oilt-6 - α7Oilt-7 -α8Oilt-8 + ℰt 
From the regression, and then testing for the null hypothesis (Ho), which is 
when the αs are jointly equal to zero. The F-test is used for this joint hypothesis 
test. If we reject the null hypothesis, it indicates that oil price change Granger 
causes recessions in the U.S. This procedure can be reversed by making the oil 
price the dependent variable and GDP the independent variable to establish if GDP 
Granger causes oil prices fluctuations, using the formula below: 
Oil = Bo + B1Oilt-1 + B2Oilt-2 + B3Oilt-3 + B4Oilt-4 +B5Oilt-5 + B6Oilt-6 + B7Oilt-7  
         + B8Oilt-8- α1 GDPt-1 - α2 GDPt-2 - α3 GDPt-3 - α4 GDPt-4- α5 GDPt-5 –  
          α6GDPt-6 –α7GDPt-7 –  α8 GDPt-8+ ℰt 
Table 9 presents the F-statistics of the Granger causality test for each of the 
equations in the sample period from January 1949 to December 2012 on a 
quarterly basis, which appendix D shows F- statistics calculation. The significance 
of the equation as a whole is determined by verifying that the F-statistic is greater 
than F-critical. Also, if the F-statistic is greater than F-critical then I am able to 
identify that the independent variable is Granger causing the dependent variable to 
move.  
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Table 9: Granger Causality F-statistics (5% percent level of significance) 
   
Table 9 concludes that oil prices change do Granger causes U.S. recession but 
U.S. recessions do not Granger cause oil prices changes. Based on the evidence on 
the Granger Causality test, we can conclude that the U.S. recessions are caused by 
oil prices increases. The specific information used can be found in Appendix C. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sample  1949II -2012IV Oil prices ---> Recession  Recession --->Oil prices 
F-statistics 1.95 0.056 
F-critical 1.94 1.94 
Conclusion 
Oil prices do Granger 
causes U.S. recession 
U.S. recessions do not 
Granger causes oil prices 
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Chapter 6 Conclusion 
 
This paper tests for a relationship between oil price changes and economic 
activity, and it attempts to address the question: do increases in oil prices (oil 
shocks) precede a recession in the U.S.? In order to answer this question several 
tests were made. The binary cyclical indicator tested the turning point of oil prices 
compared with those of GDP, finding that oil prices almost always increase an 
average of five months before a recession. This suggests that an oil shock might 
occur before a recession. It also indicates that increases in oil prices may be 
reliable indicators of the U.S. having a recession. 
 The correlation test shows that WPU oil price index cycles and NBER U.S. 
cycles are a weak positively correlated, which mean that the WPU oil price index 
cycles move in the same direction as the NBER US cycles. Even though the WPU 
oil price index cycle is positive, the relationship is very weak and is somewhat 
insignificant. The NBER US cycles have a higher correlation when the WPU Oil 
Price Index cycles move back in different time period. The correlation test also is 
an indication of a strong positive correlation between the U.S. GDP, and oil prices. 
This means that the U.S. GDP often moves in the same direction as oil prices. 
 The Granger causality test shows that oil prices Granger cause the U.S. 
recessions, indicating that the oil price is a useful tool to indicate the U.S. cycle. 
While, the result of the Granger causality shows that the U.S. recession just 
occurred at the same time as the oil price increase.  
Combining this analysis from the literature, there are several other issues: 
explanations that the spike in oil prices is one major cause of recession. There is 
some evidence that the effect of oil price changes on the macroeconomy may not 
be linear; a negative effect of a spike up in oil prices is more pronounced than the 
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positive effect of the same size of a decrease in oil prices. Also, the literature 
concludes that significant increases in oil prices (oil shocks) result in slower GDP 
growth and are a contributing factor of U.S. recessions, a higher unemployment 
rate, and increases in the cost of living. Some economists argue that oil shocks are 
not just coincidently happening at the same time as recessions. Furthermore, all 
but one of the U.S. recessions since World War II has been proceeded by an 
increase in the price of oil, the exception being the minor recession of 1960. 
Therefore, it is worthwhile to continue investigating this relationship between oil 
prices and the U.S. economic activity by reproducing Hamilton’s results. We 
should also try to come with difference methods beside what has been shown in 
the research to predict the relationship between oil prices and U.S. recessions.  
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Appendix A: Data 
 
  
1=expansion 
  
1=expansion 
  
0= recession  
  
0= recession  
 
Oil price  
From  U.S. 
DCB of 
Economic 
Analysis 
WPU Oil 
Price Index 
cycles from 
Bry- 
Boschan 
GDP in 
billions of 
chained 2005 
dollars from 
U.S. DCB of 
Economic 
Analysis 
GDP Growth Rate 
from Economagic 
Cycle Dates 
from NBER 
 1949 01   11.40 0 1770.7 -5.45 0 
 1949 02   11.37 0 1768 -1.45 0 
 1949 03  11.30 0 1766.5 4.56 0 
 1949 04   11.30 0 1793.3 -3.69 1 
 1950 01  11.30 0 1821.8 17.15 1 
 1950 02  11.30 1 1855.3 12.75 1 
 1950 03 11.30 1 1865.3 16.60 1 
 1950 04  11.40 0 1868.2 7.23 1 
 1951 01   11.40 0 1842.2 5.14 1 
 1951 02   11.40 0 1835.5 6.81 1 
 1951 03   11.40 0 1856.1 8.21 1 
 1951 04  11.40 0 1838.7 0.68 1 
 1952 01 11.40 0 1913 4.09 1 
 1952 02  11.40 0 1971.2 0.43 1 
 1952 03 11.40 0 2048.4 2.71 1 
 1952 04 11.40 1 2084.4 13.87 1 
 1953 01  11.60 1 2110.7 7.70 1 
 1953 02  12.03 1 2145.7 3.06 1 
 1953 03   12.70 0 2188.5 -2.41 0 
 1953 04   12.60 0 2192.2 -6.19 0 
 1954 01  12.60 0 2214.3 -1.89 0 
 1954 02  12.60 0 2216.7 0.50 0 
 1954 03 12.60 0 2231.6 4.58 1 
 1954 04  12.60 0 2305.3 8.26 1 
 1955 01  12.60 0 2348.4 12.01 1 
 1955 02 12.60 0 2366.2 6.80 1 
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 1955 03   12.60 0 2351.8 5.44 1 
 1955 04  12.60 0 2314.6 2.25 1 
 1956 01 12.60 1 2303.5 -1.80 1 
 1956 02  12.63 1 2306.4 3.17 1 
 1956 03  12.70 1 2332.4 -0.50 1 
 1956 04  12.73 1 2379.1 6.71 1 
 1957 01   13.73 1 2447.7 2.48 1 
 1957 02  14.00 0 2488.1 -0.97 1 
 1957 03   14.00 0 2521.4 3.91 1 
 1957 04   14.00 0 2535.5 -4.15 0 
 1958 01  14.00 0 2523.9 -10.39 0 
 1958 02  14.00 0 2543.8 2.47 0 
 1958 03  13.90 0 2540.6 9.72 1 
 1958 04  13.90 0 2582.1 9.65 1 
 1959 01   13.57 0 2597.9 8.33 1 
 1959 02   13.60 0 2591.7 10.50 1 
 1959 03  13.53 0 2616.6 -0.47 1 
 1959 04  13.40 0 2589.1 1.41 1 
 1960 01  13.40 0 2519 9.28 1 
 1960 02  13.40 0 2534.5 -1.86 0 
 1960 03  13.40 0 2593.9 0.65 0 
 1960 04  13.40 0 2654.3 -5.03 0 
 1961 01   13.40 1 2708 2.40 0 
 1961 02   13.50 1 2776.4 7.69 1 
 1961 03   13.50 0 2773.1 6.62 1 
 1961 04   13.50 0 2782.8 8.39 1 
 1962 01  13.50 0 2845.3 7.37 1 
 1962 02  13.50 0 2832 4.49 1 
 1962 03  13.50 0 2836.6 3.75 1 
 1962 04  13.50 0 2800.2 0.99 1 
 1963 01   13.50 1 2816.9 5.33 1 
 1963 02   13.50 1 2869.6 5.10 1 
 1963 03   13.50 0 2915.9 7.75 1 
 1963 04   13.40 0 2975.3 3.08 1 
 1964 01 13.40 0 3028.7 9.27 1 
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 1964 02  13.40 0 3062.1 4.68 1 
 1964 03  13.40 0 3090.4 5.55 1 
 1964 04  13.40 0 3097.9 1.11 1 
 1965 01   13.40 0 3138.4 10.19 1 
 1965 02  13.40 0 3177.7 5.54 1 
 1965 03   13.40 0 3237.6 8.36 1 
 1965 04   13.40 0 3262.2 10.00 1 
 1966 01  13.40 1 3335.4 10.18 1 
 1966 02  13.43 1 3373.7 1.34 1 
 1966 03  13.50 1 3419.5 2.66 1 
 1966 04 13.60 1 3429 3.28 1 
 1967 01   13.60 1 3513.3 3.57 1 
 1967 02   13.60 1 3560.9 0.09 1 
 1967 03  13.67 1 3633.2 3.22 1 
 1967 04   13.70 1 3720.8 3.09 1 
 1968 01  13.70 1 3812.2 8.50 1 
 1968 02  13.70 1 3824.9 6.97 1 
 1968 03  13.80 1 3850 2.77 1 
 1968 04  13.80 1 3881.2 1.74 1 
 1969 01   13.97 1 3915.4 6.09 1 
 1969 02   14.50 0 3916.2 1.17 1 
 1969 03  14.50 0 3947.5 2.55 1 
 1969 04  14.50 0 3977.6 -1.87 1 
 1970 01  14.50 0 4059.5 -0.63 0 
 1970 02  14.50 0 4128.5 0.74 0 
 1970 03 14.30 1 4156.7 3.61 0 
 1970 04  14.67 1 4174.7 -4.18 0 
 1971 01   15.60 0 4240.5 11.50 1 
 1971 02   15.60 0 4252.8 2.29 1 
 1971 03   15.60 0 4279.7 3.23 1 
 1971 04   15.60 0 4259.6 1.12 1 
 1972 01  15.40 0 4252.9 7.34 1 
 1972 02 15.40 1 4260.7 9.83 1 
 1972 03  15.53 1 4298.6 3.89 1 
 1972 04  15.60 1 4253 6.76 1 
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 1973 01   15.63 1 4370.3 10.63 1 
 1973 02  16.57 1 4395.1 4.71 1 
 1973 03   17.53 1 4430.2 -2.12 1 
 1973 04   19.03 1 4442.5 3.87 1 
 1974 01  26.43 1 4521.9 -3.46 0 
 1974 02  27.50 1 4629.1 1.03 0 
 1974 03  30.67 1 4673.5 -3.89 0 
 1974 04  30.90 1 4750.5 -1.57 0 
 1975 01   31.00 1 4872 -4.78 0 
 1975 02   32.83 1 4928.4 3.09 1 
 1975 03  34.63 1 4902.1 6.91 1 
 1975 04   35.53 1 4948.8 5.33 1 
 1976 01  34.00 1 4905.4 9.40 1 
 1976 02  33.57 1 4918 3.05 1 
 1976 03  34.70 1 4869.4 1.97 1 
 1976 04  36.10 1 4850.2 2.94 1 
 1977 01   36.67 1 4791.2 4.72 1 
 1977 02   37.03 1 4827.8 8.19 1 
 1977 03   37.27 1 4909.1 7.35 1 
 1977 04   38.63 1 4973.3 -0.09 1 
 1978 01  39.63 1 5086.3 1.37 1 
 1978 02  40.40 1 5124.6 16.69 1 
 1978 03  41.40 1 5149.7 3.98 1 
 1978 04  42.27 1 5187.1 5.40 1 
 1979 01   43.73 1 5247.3 0.67 1 
 1979 02   46.30 1 5351.6 0.37 1 
 1979 03   53.57 1 5447.3 2.91 1 
 1979 04   61.70 1 5446.1 1.11 1 
 1980 01  70.50 1 5464.7 1.29 0 
 1980 02  73.77 0 5679.7 -7.95 0 
 1980 03  76.80 0 5735.4 -0.74 0 
 1980 04  82.40 0 5811.3 7.60 0 
 1981 01   108.63 0 5821 8.58 1 
 1981 02   113.57 0 5826.4 -3.16 1 
 1981 03   108.77 0 5868.3 4.95 1 
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 1981 04   107.33 0 5884.5 -4.89 1 
 1982 01  104.63 0 5903.4 -6.41 1 
 1982 02  97.90 0 5782.4 2.18 1 
 1982 03  97.97 1 5771.7 -1.53 1 
 1982 04  99.50 1 5878.4 0.31 1 
 1983 01   95.03 0 6000.6 5.06 1 
 1983 02  92.43 0 5952.7 9.30 1 
 1983 03  92.10 0 6025 8.13 1 
 1983 04  92.07 0 5950 8.53 1 
 1984 01  92.10 0 5852.3 7.99 1 
 1984 02  91.87 0 5884 7.08 1 
 1984 03  91.53 0 5861.4 3.94 1 
 1984 04  89.77 0 5866 3.30 1 
 1985 01   84.63 0 5938.9 3.82 1 
 1985 02   84.50 0 6072.4 3.43 1 
 1985 03   84.00 0 6192.2 6.40 1 
 1985 04   84.70 0 6320.2 3.07 1 
 1986 01  66.40 0 6442.8 3.90 1 
 1986 02  40.67 0 6554 1.62 1 
 1986 03  38.57 0 6617.7 3.91 1 
 1986 04  42.00 1 6671.6 1.95 1 
 1987 01   51.70 1 6734.5 2.23 1 
 1987 02   54.77 1 6791.5 4.32 1 
 1987 03   59.57 1 6897.6 3.51 1 
 1987 04   55.87 0 6950 7.02 1 
 1988 01  49.00 0 7016.8 2.08 1 
 1988 02  50.40 0 7045 5.24 1 
 1988 03  44.43 0 7112.9 2.08 1 
 1988 04 40.93 0 7147.3 5.45 1 
 1989 01   51.30 1 7186.9 3.09 1 
 1989 02   58.90 1 7263.3 3.03 1 
 1989 03   56.53 1 7326.3 3.21 1 
 1989 04   58.33 1 7451.7 0.88 1 
 1990 01  63.10 1 7490.2 4.24 1 
 1990 02  51.67 1 7586.4 1.60 1 
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 1990 03 70.83 1 7625.6 -0.01 0 
 1990 04  98.20 0 7727.4 -3.46 0 
 1991 01   68.73 0 7799.9 -1.92 0 
 1991 02  57.10 0 7858.3 2.73 1 
 1991 03   60.03 0 7920.6 1.70 1 
 1991 04  61.80 0 7937.9 1.58 1 
 1992 01  51.93 0 8020.8 4.46 1 
 1992 02  59.83 0 8052.7 4.32 1 
 1992 03  61.83 0 8052.6 4.19 1 
 1992 04  58.57 0 7982 4.27 1 
 1993 01  55.40 0 7943.4 0.74 1 
 1993 02   56.17 0 7997 2.58 1 
 1993 03   48.33 0 8030.7 2.12 1 
 1993 04   45.57 0 8062.2 5.39 1 
 1994 01  38.90 0 8150.7 3.95 1 
 1994 02  48.17 1 8237.3 5.59 1 
 1994 03  52.97 1 8322.3 2.60 1 
 1994 04  48.50 0 8409.8 4.52 1 
 1995 01   50.00 0 8425.3 0.99 1 
 1995 02   54.87 0 8479.2 0.86 1 
 1995 03   49.60 0 8523.8 3.40 1 
 1995 04   49.83 1 8636.4 2.82 1 
 1996 01  55.50 1 8720.5 2.77 1 
 1996 02  61.57 1 8839.8 7.10 1 
 1996 03  63.03 1 8896.7 3.53 1 
 1996 04 70.47 1 8995.5 4.44 1 
 1997 01   64.73 0 9017.6 3.11 1 
 1997 02   56.03 0 9037 6.06 1 
 1997 03   54.37 0 9112.9 5.12 1 
 1997 04   54.83 0 9176.4 3.10 1 
 1998 01  40.80 0 9239.3 3.83 1 
 1998 02  36.67 0 9399 3.65 1 
 1998 03  34.10 0 9480.8 5.38 1 
 1998 04 31.33 0 9584.3 7.10 1 
 1999 01   29.90 1 9658 3.61 1 
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 1999 02   46.13 1 9801.2 3.16 1 
 1999 03   58.80 1 9924.2 5.19 1 
 1999 04   66.20 1 10000.3 7.38 1 
 2000 01  80.87 1 10094.8 1.05 1 
 2000 02 79.67 1 10185.6 8.03 0 
 2000 03  90.00 1 10320 0.34 0 
 2000 04  90.23 1 10498.6 2.39 0 
 2001 01   76.40 0 10592.1 -1.31 1 
 2001 02  76.40 0 10674.9 2.64 1 
 2001 03   72.80 0 10810.7 -1.10 1 
 2001 04   51.20 0 11004.8 1.41 1 
 2002 01  55.70 1 11033.6 3.46 1 
 2002 02  70.47 1 11248.8 2.14 1 
 2002 03  72.87 1 11258.3 2.05 1 
 2002 04  72.40 1 11325 0.14 1 
 2003 01   92.13 1 11287.8 1.68 1 
 2003 02   77.47 1 11361.7 3.43 1 
 2003 03   80.40 1 11330.4 6.75 1 
 2003 04   81.80 1 11370 3.67 1 
 2004 01  92.47 1 11467.1 2.66 1 
 2004 02  101.37 1 11528.1 2.60 1 
 2004 03  114.37 1 11586.6 3.01 1 
 2004 04  124.53 1 11590.6 3.31 1 
 2005 01   129.50 1 11638.9 4.19 1 
 2005 02   140.10 1 11737.5 1.79 1 
 2005 03   168.37 1 11930.7 3.21 1 
 2005 04   162.27 1 12038.6 2.07 1 
 2006 01  166.47 1 12117.9 5.15 1 
 2006 02 188.73 1 12195.9 1.63 1 
 2006 03 190.97 1 12286.7 0.05 1 
 2006 04  157.63 0 12387.2 2.75 1 
 2007 01   153.47 0 12515 0.54 1 
 2007 02   171.70 1 12570.7 3.65 1 
 2007 03   204.27 1 12670.5 2.95 1 
 2007 04   240.90 1 12735.6 1.70 1 
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 2008 01  269.40 1 12896.4 -1.77 0 
 2008 02  343.80 1 12948.7 1.32 0 
 2008 03  332.47 1 12950.4 -3.66 0 
 2008 04  157.00 0 13038.4 -8.89 0 
 2009 01   104.47 0 13056.1 -5.25 0 
 2009 02   159.73 1 13173.6 -0.31 0 
 2009 03   179.17 1 13269.8 1.45 1 
 2009 04   203.50 1 13326 4.03 1 
 2010 01  215.23 1 13266.8 2.34 1 
 2010 02 214.90 1 13310.5 2.24 1 
 2010 03  209.00 1 13186.9 2.60 1 
 2010 04  235.00 1 12883.5 2.39 1 
 2011 01   259.03 1 12711 0.08 1 
 2011 02   292.93 1 12701 2.48 1 
 2011 03   266.10 1 12746.7 1.28 1 
 2011 04  283.77 0 12873.1 4.09 1 
 2012 01  297.47 0 12947.6 1.96 1 
 2012 02  270.73 0 13019.6 1.25 1 
 2012 03  267.07 1 13103.5 3.11 1 
 2012 04  257.97 1 13181.2 0.38 1 
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Appendix B: The Hamilton model 
 
Table 10: Statistical summary output result for the Hamilton model  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regression 
Statistics   
    Multiple R 0.40192833 
    R Square 0.16154638 
    Adjusted R 
Square 0.13063565 
    Standard 
Error 3.86477517 
    Observations 226 
    
      ANOVA 
     
  df SS MS F 
Significance 
F 
Regression 8 624.491324 78.0614155 5.226223176 5.46125E-06 
Residual 217 3241.217719 14.9364871     
Total 225 3865.709043       
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept 2.763348213 0.432982613 6.382122818 1.04242E-09 
GDP (t-1) 0.296374147 0.067199419 4.410367678 1.62424E-05 
GDP (t-2) 0.140377092 0.069777979 2.011767798 0.045480934 
GDP (t-3) -0.09897456 0.069660556 -1.42081208 0.156806729 
GDP (t-4) -0.097184286 0.06685279 -1.453705757 0.147472608 
Oil price (t-1) -1.232531558 2.717961697 -0.453476427 0.650658862 
Oil price (t-2) -4.142147221 2.768380833 -1.496234612 0.136045502 
Oil price (t-3) 1.076322451 2.762926541 0.389558837 0.697244842 
Oil price (t-4) -4.446496615 2.726438146 -1.630881163 0.104365896 
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Appendix C: Granger Causality Test 
 
 Granger causality test is a technique to test if one time series variable 
consistently and predictably changes before another variable. 
Equation 1 
GDP = Bo + B1GDPt-1 +B2GDPt-2 + B3GDPt-3 + B4GDPt-4 +B5GDPt-5 +B6GDPt-6 +  
B7GDPt-7 + B8GDPt-8 - α1Oilt-1 - α2Oilt-2 - α3Oilt-3 -α4Oilt-4 - α5Oilt-5 - α6Oilt-6  
- α7Oilt-7 -α8Oilt-8 + ℰt 
Table 11: Statistical summary output on equation 1 
 
Regression 
Statistics   
    Multiple R 0.459583861 
    R Square 0.211217325 
    Adjusted R 
Square 0.157966174 
    Standard Error 3.719900935 
    Observations 254 
    
      
  df SS MS F 
Significance 
F 
Regression 16 878.1794501 54.88622 3.966437 1.20028E-06 
Residual 237 3279.526123 13.83766     
Total 253 4157.705573       
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept 2.472364711 0.500867705 4.936163 1.5E-06 
GDP (t-1) 0.315637794 0.064469263 4.895942 1.81E-06 
GDP (t-2) 0.139522865 0.066636676 2.093785 0.037342 
GDP (t-3) -0.079954202 0.067468621 -1.18506 0.237182 
GDP (t-4) -0.047430455 0.067416007 -0.70355 0.482404 
GDP (t-5) -0.072758827 0.067021442 -1.08561 0.278757 
GDP (t-6) 0.032381099 0.066954614 0.483628 0.629097 
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 Equation 2 
GDP = Bo + B1GDPt-1 +B2GDPt-2 + B3GDPt-3 + B4GDPt-4 +B5GDPt-5 +B6GDPt-6 
             +B7GDPt-7 + B8GDPt-8+ℰt 
Table 12: Statistical summary output on equation 2 
 
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept 2.335036666 0.474820513 4.917724917 1.60582E-06 
GDP (t-1) 0.322496097 0.063957685 5.042335351 8.95018E-07 
GDP (t-7) -0.006648086 0.066364735 -0.10017 0.92029 
GDP (t-8) 0.0139683 0.062918501 0.222006 0.8245 
Oil price (t-1) -2.298725295 2.090315369 -1.0997 0.272577 
Oil price (t-2) -3.149371601 2.147764207 -1.46635 0.143879 
Oil price (t-3) -1.477504809 2.183697189 -0.67661 0.499315 
Oil price (t-4) -3.256705611 2.170778463 -1.50025 0.134881 
Oil price (t-5) 0.20090958 2.180158733 0.092154 0.926654 
Oil price (t-6) 0.194952372 2.188532797 0.089079 0.929094 
Oil price (t-7) -4.966199813 2.152093443 -2.30761 0.021883 
Oil price (t-8) 4.182670212 2.118887146 1.973994 0.049544 
Regression 
Statistics   
    Multiple R 0.398916681 
    R Square 0.159134518 
    Adjusted R 
Square 0.131677686 
    Standard 
Error 3.777522728 
    Observations 254 
    
      
  df SS MS F 
Significance 
F 
Regression 8 661.634473 82.70430912 5.795807681 8.880E-07 
Residual 245 3496.0711 14.26967796     
Total 253 4157.705573       
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GDP (t-2) 0.140974751 0.066854029 2.108694927 0.035986296 
GDP (t-3) -0.059645313 0.067429716 -0.884555297 0.377263776 
GDP (t-4) -0.056169425 0.067313788 -0.834441597 0.404845065 
GDP (t-5) -0.081234916 0.067251458 -1.207927953 0.228239678 
GDP (t-6) 0.034028601 0.067295522 0.505659211 0.613550534 
GDP (t-7) -0.010173559 0.06673089 -0.152456511 0.878952366 
GDP (t-8) -2.18942E-05 0.063193693 -0.000346462 0.999723846  
Equation 3 
Oil = Bo + B1Oilt-1 + B2Oilt-2 + B3Oilt-3 + B4Oilt-4 +B5Oilt-5 + B6Oilt-6 + B7Oilt-7  
         + B8Oilt-8- α1 GDPt-1 - α2 GDPt-2 - α3 GDPt-3 - α4 GDPt-4- α5 GDPt-5 
              – α6 GDPt-6 – α7GDPt-7 –  α8 GDPt-8+ ℰt 
Table 13: Statistical summary output on equation 3 
 
Regression 
Statistics   
    Multiple R 0.33156925 
    R Square 0.109938168 
    Adjusted R 
Square 0.049849605 
    Standard Error 0.115703818 
    Observations 254 
    
      
  df SS MS F 
Significance 
F 
Regression 16 0.39189709 0.024494 1.829602 0.028275945 
Residual 237 3.172807495 0.013387     
Total 253 3.564704585       
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept 0.009052397 0.015578992 0.581064 0.561749 
Oil price (t-1) 0.238404894 0.06501718 3.666798 0.000303 
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 Equation 4 
Oil = Bo + B1Oilt-1 + B2Oilt-2 + B3Oilt-3 + B4Oilt-4 +B5Oilt-5 + B6Oilt-6 + B7Oilt-7  
         + B8Oilt-8+ ℰt 
Table 14: Statistical summary output on equation 4 
Oil price (t-2) -0.167971076 0.066804069 -2.51438 0.012588 
Oil price (t-3) 0.060898924 0.067921728 0.896604 0.37084 
Oil price (t-4) -0.092711728 0.067519904 -1.3731 0.171018 
Oil price (t-5) -0.112673029 0.067811668 -1.66156 0.097924 
Oil price (t-6) 0.038141997 0.068072135 0.560317 0.575792 
Oil price (t-7) 0.025461711 0.066938725 0.380373 0.704009 
Oil price (t-8) -0.019030187 0.065905877 -0.28875 0.773027 
GDP (t-1) 0.001591673 0.002005252 0.793752 0.428134 
GDP (t-2) -0.002659799 0.002072668 -1.28327 0.20065 
GDP (t-3) 0.00018026 0.002098544 0.085898 0.93162 
GDP (t-4) 0.001606013 0.002096908 0.765896 0.4445 
GDP (t-5) 0.000964366 0.002084635 0.462607 0.644071 
GDP (t-6) -0.001773354 0.002082557 -0.85153 0.395336 
GDP (t-7) 0.002330982 0.002064209 1.129237 0.259939 
GDP (t-8) -0.000668776 0.001957017 -0.34173 0.732855 
Regression 
Statistics   
    Multiple R 0.305666057 
    R Square 0.093431738 
    Adjusted R 
Square 0.063829509 
    Standard 
Error 0.114849467 
    Observations 254 
    
      
  df SS MS F 
Significance 
F 
Regression 8 0.333056545 0.041632068 3.156239966 0.002022927 
Residual 245 3.23164804 0.0131904     
Total 253 3.564704585       
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  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept 0.01453078 0.007639411 1.902081048 0.058333374 
Oil price (t-1) 0.231597986 0.063954908 3.621269955 0.000356246 
Oil price (t-2) -0.170707179 0.065637937 -2.600739566 0.009867888 
Oil price (t-3) 0.06101506 0.066564132 0.916635713 0.360234953 
Oil price (t-4) -0.084897634 0.066208474 -1.28227747 0.200957279 
Oil price (t-5) -0.125918637 0.066197998 -1.902151741 0.058324089 
Oil price (t-6) 0.050561135 0.06632007 0.762380601 0.446566226 
Oil price (t-7) 0.017863095 0.065613871 0.272245713 0.785662391 
Oil price (t-8) -0.02947327 0.063885039 -0.461348545 0.644957882 
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Appendix D: F-statistics calculation  
 
Fc = ( SSRr - SSRur ) / M 
                 SSRur / (N-K-1) 
 
Where SSRr = residual sum of squares from the constrained equation 
 SSRur = residual sum of squares from the unconstrained equation 
 M= the number of constrained (or the number of coefficients being jointly 
tested) 
 N = the number of observation 
 K = the number of independence variables in the unconstrained equation. 
 
The F-statistics was found using the Granger Causality test for oil prices 
cause of recessions. For the unconstrained equation, equation 1 is used from 
appendix C to find SSRur which calculate to be 3279.52. The constrained equation, 
equation 2 is used from appendix C to find SSRr which calculate to be 3496.07. M 
is equal to eight because in equation 2 have the eight lagged of change values for 
the quarterly GDP growth rate. K is equal 16 because in equation 1, there are eight 
lagged of change values for the quarterly GDP growth rate and the eight lagged of 
change value for the logarithmic change in oil price. 
Fc = (  3496.07- 3279.53) / 8 
                 3279.53 / (254-16-1) 
    =  1.95 
 
The F-statistics was found using the Granger Causality test for recessions 
cause of oil prices. For the unconstrained equation, equation 3 is used from 
appendix C to find SSRur which calculate to be 3.17. The constrained equation, 
equation 4 is used from appendix C to find SSRr which calculate to be 3.23. M is 
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equal to eight because in equation 4 have the eight lagged of change value for the 
logarithmic change in oil price. K is equal 16 because in equation 3, there are eight 
lagged of change values for the quarterly GDP growth rate and the eight lagged of 
change value for the logarithmic change in oil price. 
Fc = (3.23- 3.17) / 8 
                 3.17/ (254-16-1) 
    =  0.054 
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Appendix E: Overview of the studies cited and their 
principal results 
 
Table 15: Overview of the studies cited and their principal results 
Authors and period studied Objective / General idea Results 
Hamilton (1983) 1948-1980 
    
Illustrate that  the 
correlation between oil 
shock and the US 
recessions is not statics  
coincidence 
The result of increases in 
oil price caused a decline 
of output within 3-4 
quarters later. Also, it will 
take 1 to 2 years for the 
economy to begin to 
recover the output 
growth. 
Gisser, Goodwin (1986)  
1961-1982  Replicate Hamilton’s 
results in 1983, compare 
with relationship between 
oil prices and output before 
or after 1973. 
  
Monetary and fiscal 
policy cannot only just 
explain the result of 
increased oil price due to 
economic output. 
  
The effect on the oil 
prices that affects the 
economy have not 
changed since 1973. 
    
Loungani (1986) 1947-1982 
Purposed that all the 
interruptions that occurred 
in the global oil market 
caused unemployment 
through sector rotation. 
  
Quarterly employment data for  
28 industries 
Labor reallocation 
process is the main 
reason for the increase in 
oil prices in 1950s and 
1970s. 
Mork (1989) 1948-1988 
Replicate Hamilton’s result 
in 1983 of a negative 
correlation between 
increases in oil prices and 
the output growth and 
adjust the data unit 1988. 
  
Analyses of Hamilton’s 
result are still correct 
when the oil market 
collapse of the 1980s. Oil 
prices are still considered 
part of reason why the 
market collapses. 
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 Show stronger evidence 
of the negative 
correlation between 
increases in oil prices 
and output than 
Hamilton. 
 
In 1980, economic output 
growth slowed because 
of the asymmetry effect 
changing in oil prices 
Authors and period studied Objective / General idea Results 
Lee et al. (1995) 1950-1992 
The important point of how 
to measure the oil price 
shock by a change in the 
given oil price differs from 
the historical pattern 
  
Oil shocks have a great 
impact on the volatile 
environment. 
  
   For growth rate output-
The negative affect from 
oil price shock happened 
4 quarters later, recovery 
after 6 quarters after the 
shock  
  
 For Unemployment 
happened 4-8 quarters 
after the oil  
Ferderer (1996) 1970-1990 
Asymmetry effects to 
economy from oil shock 
     Monetary policy has 
less impact on economic 
activity that volatility and 
oil price changes  
daily spot market oil prices 
    Oil price increases 
causing to have  high 
volatility 
  
  
    The industrial 
production use oil price 
volatility and the Federal 
funds rate to explain 
fluctuations that occur. 
    
  
     Negative volatility has 
a significant impact on 
output growth, gain in 
output will happened 11 
months later 
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     Output growth has a 
significant impact after oil 
price changes about 12 
months 
Rotemberg and Woodford 
(1996) 1948-1980   
Output growth and real 
wages can explain the 
great effect of oil price 
change in the imperfectly 
competitive market. 
    A 1% increase in oil 
prices results in a 
reduction in output of 
about -.25 percent after 5 
- 7 quarters 
  
    After 5 or 6 quarters 
after the oil price increase 
by 10%, real wages fall by 
1% 
  
    Second year after the 
oil price shock, it is more 
important in decline, in 
output, and real wages 
gains. 
Hooker (1996) 1948-1994 
Proved the linear  relation 
(Hamiltion 1983) and the 
asymmetric relation (Mork 
1989) between oil prices 
and output  
1948-1972: 
10% increase in oil prices 
caused the GDP growth 
rate to decrease by 0.6 % 
in the 3rd-4th quarters 
later 
1973-1994: 
Oil prices can be used to 
predict unemployment 
and GDP growth. 
However, volatility can 
sometimes be used for 
predict of GDP growth 
  
Hamilton (1996) 1973-1994 
Due to the oil price 
volatility since 1986,he 
tried to analyze oil price 
development (net oil price 
increase (NOPI))  
During period from 1948 
to 1994, relation between 
GDP growth and NOPI 
remains statistically 
significant  
Hamilton (2000) 1949:1999   
Oil price increases have a 
larger effect than oil price 
decreases. A long period 
of stable prices has a 
bigger impact than simply 
correcting previous 
decreases.  
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From 1949 to 1980 a 10% 
increase in oil prices 
resulted, 4 quarters later, 
in GDP growth rate 
having dropped 1.4%. 
  
Chaudhuri (2000) 1973-1996   
Real oil prices have an 
influence on real 
commodity and may 
affect the primary 
commodity prices, even if 
oil is not being used 
directly in the production 
of those commodities.  
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